Privacy
The short version: I don't collect anything.
No accounts, no analytics, no trackers, no cookies that follow you, no profile with your name on it. Not because a policy makes me — because privacy is the whole point of what I build.
I built FrogNet so your life would stop living on someone else's computer. It would be strange to run a surveillance operation on the website that says so.
So this site doesn't. There is no analytics script, no advertising pixel, no third-party tracker, and no cookie that identifies you. I don't know who you are, what else you've looked at, or where you go next — and I've built it that way on purpose.
No tracking, no analytics, no ads
The site loads no analytics, no ad networks, and no social pixels. Nothing here is watching you read.
No accounts, no profiles
You don't log in, and there's no database with your name in it. Nothing to leak, sell, or subpoena — because it doesn't exist.
Email only if you write to me
If you request a license or send a message, you're composing an ordinary email. I use what you tell me only to write back — I don't add you to a list, and I don't pass it to anyone.
The form is a drop box, not a door
The public form can't reach the network — it writes your request into a watched folder and nothing more. The inside pulls it out and inspects it; nothing on the internet gets a route in. Compromise the form and you'd own a folder of files, not a foothold.
The product carries no telemetry
FrogNet runs on your hardware. It doesn't phone home, report usage, or route your traffic through me. There's no centre to collect anything, by design — that's the architecture, not a promise.
Standard hosting logs, nothing more
Whoever serves these pages may keep basic request logs (an IP address, a timestamp) the way every web server does. I don't build profiles from them, and I don't combine them with anything else.
Why the form can't be a way in
People who know how sites get breached ask the fair question: if there's a form here, isn't that a door into the network? No — and the reason is architectural, not a promise. What faces the internet writes files into a watched folder and never addresses the network; it has no route in. Something on the inside reaches out, pulls each file, inspects it, and only then hands the vetted result along. The inside reaches out and pulls; the outside never reaches in — a selective directional gap, not a classic air-gap.
The web server and the broker for this site happen to run on a single droplet, rather than the recommended split across two hosts. That's a deliberate choice, and it changes nothing above: because the form is a drop box, co-locating it with the broker still puts nothing on the network within reach. Even on one box it runs comfortably — the limiting axis was never the machine, it's the network, and semantic compression cut that to a trickle, leaving ample headroom for real work, live video included.
If that ever changes
It won't change quietly. If anything about the above ever needs updating, it will be said plainly, right here, in the same plain language — not buried in a policy nobody reads.
— John W. Fawcett · Fawcett Innovations LLC · john@fawcettinnovations.com
Own it outright
The surest privacy is a network with no middle.
That's the real answer to "who can see this?" — nobody, because there's no company in the path. Read how it works, then run your own.